En esta quinta entrega, el artículo expone las conclusiones de la revisión crítica a la teoría del Capital Humano, además de listar las referencias expuestar anteriormente. Para ver las demás entradas que he publicado sobre este tema, hacer click:
http://ivan-salinas.blogspot.com/2013/02/notas-criticas-sobre-el-capital-humano-1.html
http://ivan-salinas.blogspot.com/2015/02/notas-criticas-sobre-el-capital-humano-2.html
http://ivan-salinas.blogspot.com/2015/02/notas-criticas-sobre-el-capital-humano-3.html
http://ivan-salinas.blogspot.com/2015/02/notas-criticas-sobre-el-capital-humano-4.html
http://ivan-salinas.blogspot.com/2015/06/notas-criticas-sobre-el-capital-humano-5.html
http://ivan-salinas.blogspot.com/2015/06/notas-criticas-sobre-el-capital-humano-6.html
http://ivan-salinas.blogspot.com/2015/06/notas-criticas-sobre-el-capital-humano-7.html
Conclusión
En este artículo, la TCH ha sido discutida desde diferentes puntos de vista; perspectivas metodológica, empírica, práctica, y moral. Primero, debe notarse que la TER, inevitablemente la TCH también, tienen serias limitaciones en su marco analítico con el cual el modelo neoclásico intenta explicar los fenómenos sociales y económicos. Segundo, existen estudios empíricos cuyos resultados están en desacuerdo con la TCH y queda claro que la TCH fracasa en explicar esos casos. Así ¿cuáles son las implicancias de estas limitaciones, o debiésemos abandonar la TCH por completo? De acuerdo a Blaug (1992), estas limitaciones no son razones suficientes para renunciar a la TCH porque para creer que los programas de investigación científica se abandonan en el momento en que una refutación es encontrada es ser víctima del falsificacionismo ingenuo. Lo que se necesita para descartar un programa de investigación científica es que, primero, refutaciones frecuentes; segundo, una proliferación vergonzosa de ajustes ad hoc para evitar tales refutaciones; y finalmente, una teoría rival que explique el mismo problema/fenómeno con un marco teórico diferente pero igualmente robusto. Los oponentes de la TCH están lejos de desarrollar una nueva teoría rival que la reemplace. Como Becker recordó “hay un viejo dicho que dice que necesitas una teoría para vencer una teoría” (citado en Herfeld, 2012, p. 78). Por lo tanto, la existente TCH parece estar acá para quedarse porque, a pesar de sus limitaciones e imperfecciones, es justo decir que es aún una teoría fuerte. Aún más, no solo es fuerte en retórica, sino también sólida y perspicaz en teoría.
Segundo, sobre el homo economicus egoísta, gobernabilidad, la pregunta hecha por Green (2002) necesita ser repetida con un pequeño cambio. ¿Puede la aproximación de la elección racional, que descansa en el interés material propio, de verdad motivar a las personas a tomar decisiones basadas en interés material propio? Es más, “si la aproximación de la elección racional es alterada para permitir preferencias no egoístas, ¿se convertirá gradualmente la típica persona en la sociedad en alguien menos egoísta? (p. 64). En la misma línea, si no hubiese habido TCH o aproximación neoclásica, ¿habrían estado los legisladores menos interesados en gobernabilidad y en crear ciudadanos gobernables? Es algo difícil dar una respuesta afirmativa a esta pregunta dado el hecho de que la historia está llena de gobiernos que han usado la educación como un medio para hacer a sus ciudadanos más gobernables. Por lo tanto, esta actitud no es exclusiva de la escuela neoclásica.
Debe mencionarse que existen algunos intentos por desafiar la TCH en la academia. Por ejemplo, Cunningham (2004) enfatiza el aspecto social de la educación y las afirmaciones de que el aprendizaje es dialéctico entre las dimensiones personales y sociales. Es decir, las personas se enmarcan en sus estructuras sociales, y las estructuras sociales están construidas y formadas por personas. Por lo tanto, un individuo no puede entenderse o conceptualizarse fuera de su propio contexto social y político. De forma similar, Fevre, Rees, y Gorard (1999) afirman que la TCH es a-histórica y basada solamente en la racionalidad instrumental. Lo que Fevre y sus colegas proponen es la teoría sociológica de la participación que toma en cuenta los factores históricos, geográficos, sociales, y culturales que influencian las motivaciones individuales para la educación por-obligatoria. La teoría señala la construcción social de estas motivaciones y afirma que los individuos no son motivados por la maximización de utilidades cuando invierten en educación. Pero, esta afirmación y la teoría en general no están bien sostenidas por datos empíricos. Esto no significa que las dimensiones sociales, históricas, y geográficas no influencien las decisiones educacionales de los individuos sino que una teoría completamente adulta debiese explicar empíricamente un número considerable de casos, al menos de mejor forma que lo que explica la TCH. De otra forma, una teoría sin un sostén empírico sensato puede difícilmente competir con la TCH, sin importar cuán verdadera podría sonar en la intuición.
También es valioso mencionar que la mayoría de las críticas dirigidas a la TCH son más bien seductoras. Estas críticas dan la impresión de que tienen un mejor modelo alternativo para las políticas educativas. Pero algunas veces es bastante notorio que estas críticas están más motivadas por un entusiasmo ideológico lleno de resentimiento para solamente atacar a la escuela de pensamiento dominante, sin contar con una alternativa a la mano. Es cierto que cada crítica es valiosa en sí misma, sin importar desde donde emerja, pero el objetivo ambicioso, reemplazar la TCH, requiere mucho más que eso. Ha existido un gran número de críticas pero pocos esfuerzos sistemáticos por entender el origen y el impacto de la TCH. Se necesita una aproximación sistemática y comprehensiva para analizar y criticar de mejor forma la TCH. Es de esperar que este artículo será estimulante para tal aproximación comprehensiva.
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